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Abstract
East Germany’s unemployment rate still doubles that of West Germany and
for the last decade its economic growth has been below that of other transition
countries. Policy makers often point to the lack of entrepreneurship as one of East
Germany’s main problems. This paper addresses the question of how East Ger-
many’s integration into an established economy, West Germany, may have hindered
a fruitful development of entrepreneurship and how this may have affected eco-
nomic growth. I build a model economy that places Lucas’ [1978] span-of-control
model into an overlapping-generations framework. Following Hassler and Rodr´ıguez
Mora [2000] managerial knowhow is defined as a combination of two factors, innate
talent and entrepreneurial parental background. Furthermore, growth depends only
on the innate talent of entrepreneurs. In East Germany, the lack of entrepreneurial
parental background makes innate talent the decisive factor in occupational choice
and more talented entrepreneurs should contribute to high growth rates. However,
three key aspects of its integration into West Germany inhibit this mechanism: mi-
gration possibilities to West Germany, the way East German wages were regulated
upon reunification, and the importance of parental background for entrepreneurship
in West Germany. Counterfactual experiments show that eliminating any of these
three aspects leads to more entrepreneurs, less unemployment, and higher economic
growth in East Germany.
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1 Introduction
East Germany’s economic performance has been quite dismal for the last decade. Since
1991, unemployment rates in East Germany and Berlin, ranging from official rates of
12 − 20% to unofficial rates of 25 − 30%, have been twice as high as rates in West Ger-
many.1 Furthermore, while some other transition countries are growing to catch up with
the rest of Europe, for the last decade East Germany’s economy has grown more slowly
than the economies of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic.2 East Germany’s GDP
per capita still remains below 75% of that of West Germany (Statistische A¨mter der
La¨nder [2011]). Policy makers have identified entrepreneurship as key to employment
creation and economic growth in East Germany: “The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and its Local Economic and Employment Develop-
ment Programme has been working with the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and
Urban Affairs (BMVBS) since 2005 on an analytical and practical project on Strength-
ening entrepreneurship in East Germany as a critical lever for economic growth and em-
ployment creation” (OECD [2007a]).3
Less than twenty years ago, private entrepreneurial activity was extremely restricted or
even forbidden in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. Today the lack of
entrepreneurship seems to be persisting in East Germany, while other transition economies
have managed to overcome this hurdle.4 Table 1.1 displays the number of enterprises per
1000 inhabitants, labor force participants, and employed individuals for the period 2002-
2007, for West Germany, East Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. By
any of these three measures, there were and are significantly fewer enterprises in East
Germany compared to West Germany but in particular compared to these other transi-
1Unofficial unemployment rates take into account the so-called “hidden unemployed”, individuals who
do not appear as officially unemployed due to some form of active labor market policy (training programs,
wage subsidies, early retirement schemes) but whose income comes to a large extent in form of subsidies;
for unofficial rates: Sachversta¨ndigenrat [2007], for official rates: Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit [2008].
2Accumulated growth rates for real GDP per capita for 1992 to 2008 for East Germany, Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic are 173%, 214%, 163%, and 174% respectively. Slovenia’s GDP per
capita has already surpassed that of East Germany, see Figure A-1 of the Appendix.
3Numerous newspaper articles have pointed out that the development of the ’Mittelstand’ – the small
and medium sized enterprise sector– is essential for the revival of the East German economy. However, “in
practice, the development of east Germany’s Mittelstand is proceeding painfully slowly. Self-employment
is still much lower than in west Germany. Small businessmen in east Germany face a number of handicaps,
mostly to do with being new to the game;” (The Economist [1996]).
4In Hungary, liberalization of communist rules began in the 1970’s and by the 1980’s a so-called
’second economy’ of privately owned businesses had developed. The private sector was officially non-
existent in Czechoslovakia but more important in Poland where family farms dominated in agriculture
(OECD [1992]).
tion countries.5 .
Table 1.1: Enterprises per 1000 inhabitants; (labor force participants; employees)
West Germany East Germany Czech Republic Poland Hungary
Year (incl. firms with zero employment)
2002 32;(68;75) 26;(60;67) 86;(174;187) 39;(89;111) 55;(136;145)
2003 33;(68;76) 26;(62;69) 86;(174;189) 38;(88;109) 55;(134;143)
2004 35;(73;82) 30;(70;78) 86;(147;190) 38;(87;108) 56;(137;146)
2005 35;(73;83) 30;(72;82) 84;(167;182) 37;(83;102) 55;(133;144)
2006 36;(74;83) 32;(72;82) 84;(167;180) 38;(87;101) 54;(129;139)
2007 37;(75;84) 32;(73;83) 86;(172;182) 39;(89;99) 56;(130;141)
Data: Eurostat [2005] (NACE: C-I;K), Statistisches Bundesamt [2008] (for Germany)
When in 1990, with the end of the communist era, setting up a firm was legalized and
simplified, a whole new set of occupational choices was opened up in East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. However, different from other transition countries,
East Germany was integrated into the established economy of West Germany. In this
paper I argue that three key aspects of East Germany’s integration into West Germany
hindered a fruitful development of entrepreneurship: migration possibilities to West Ger-
many, the way East German wages were regulated upon reunification, and the importance
of parental background for entrepreneurship in West Germany.
First, since 1989 the unrestricted mobility of East Germans led to major migration flows
within Germany. Since 1998 East Germany has been losing around 0.5% of its young
population to migration each year.6 Between 1989 and 2002, net migration to West Ger-
many amounted to 1.3 million people, an equivalent of 7.5% of the original population of
the German Democratic Republic (GDR) (Heiland [2004]), and between 1995 and 2007,
19% of East Germans aged 18 to 29 left East for West Germany. Especially young and
5Even though formal aspects of doing business are actually more favorable in Germany than in other
transition countries (World Bank [2009]). Earle and Sakova [2000] point out that high rates of unem-
ployment and little welfare provision in transition countries might push individuals into self-employment
and thus far from being successful business owners these own-account workers differ little from the un-
employed. However, numbers for transition countries in Table 1.1 refer to self-employed with employees,
i.e. they operate on a larger scale than that of mere subsistence, making it unlikely that many of them
are own-account workers escaping from unemployment.
6See Figure A-2 of the Appendix. Compared to international migration rates, these are large num-
bers; e.g. current annual net migration rates from Ecuador and Mexico are 0.8% and 0.4% respectively
CIA [2008]. It is very likely that numbers are upward biased as individuals might be counted more than
once, migrating back and forth between East and West Germany. However, as this only applies to formal
changes of residence numbers cited are not contaminated by the presence of commuters.
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skilled East Germans seem to migrate to West Germany (see Hunt [2006], Ragnitz [2007]
or Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln [2009]).7 On the contrary between 1990 and 1998,
the Czech Republic and Hungary were net recipients of migration, mainly stemming from
other transition countries, while Poland lost between 0.5% and 3.9% of its original popu-
lation to migration (United Nations [2002]). Second, presumably in order to restrict the
number of East Germans migrating to West Germany, West German labor unions pressed
for parity of East and West German wages (see e.g. Akerlof et al [1991], Sinn [2002]).8
In 1991, wages in East Germany were set to 50% of West German wages despite a lower
ratio of East- to West German labor productivities. By 1995, East German wages had
reached up to 70% or more of West German wages (Sinn [2002], and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln
and Izem [2007]). On the other hand, between 1990 and 1997 wages in Poland and the
Czech Republic remained stable at around 10-20% relative to wages in West Germany
(Sinn [2002]). Third, entrepreneurial parental background was and is decisive for occu-
pational choices of West Germans. Pistrui et al [2000] find that 60% of West German
entrepreneurs have a parent who had been an entrepreneur. Contrariwise in East Ger-
many there was no past generation that could pass on knowledge on how to run a business
in a newly established market economy and despite abundant government aids only few
individuals in East Germany set up their own business.9.
The particular situation of East Germany, its poor economic performance, and the con-
trast between other transition economies and East Germany raise several questions: Why
do only few East Germans set up a business in East Germany?10 And can the resulting
lack of entrepreneurship in East Germany be linked to low economic growth? What role
does each of the proposed key aspects of East Germany’s integration into West Germany
play? How do the unrestricted mobility of East Germans, the policy of fixing East Ger-
man wages as fractions of West German wages, and the importance of entrepreneurial
parental background in West Germany influence occupational choices of East Germans
and thus economic growth?
7Bru¨ckner und Tru¨bswetter [2007] on the other hand do not find that those migrating to West Germany
are more educated than those staying in East Germany. However, they do find a positive self-selection
of migrants according to unobserved individual characteristics.
8Officially, labor unions demanded wage equity out of concern for East-West German equity and East
German welfare.
9 Between 1991 and 2005, East Germany received annual public transfers equal to 4.1% − 5.4% of
West German GDP. Transfers for support to enterprises and business-near infrastructure made up between
0.63% and 0.99% of West German GDP (Wurzel [2001])
10Diewald et al. [2006] study life-courses of East Germans after reunification and find that transitions
into self-employment between 1992 and 1996 have been “surprisingly rare”. In particular, they find that
“only 4.1 percent of our sample made this step during the Window of opportunity [1/90-6/92], and 3.8
percent did so in the second period [7/92-3/96]” (pg.73).
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In order to address these questions, both qualitatively and quantitatively, I build a model
economy that places Lucas’ [1978] span-of control model into an overlapping-generations
framework. Individuals in the model economy are characterized by their innate talent and
their parental background. Managerial knowhow is a combination of these two charac-
teristics. Given their managerial knowhow individuals decide to be unemployed, to work,
or to set up a business. The innate talent of entrepreneurs determines economic growth.
Hence, there is a direct link between individuals’ occupational choices and aggregate eco-
nomic performance. After one generation each individual is replaced by a child of random
talent.11 Children inherit bequests and in case their parent was an entrepreneur they also
receive information about how to run a business. As in Hassler and Rodr´ıguez Mora [2000],
when technological change is slow, there are few changes in the business environment and
past information about how to run a business is valuable. Managerial knowhow of children
of entrepreneurs will be higher. They will be the ones to set up their own business, rather
than the most talented individuals. Hence, talent is not optimally allocated, individuals’
occupational choices exert a negative externality on economic growth and growth remains
low. On the other hand, when technological change is fast, past information depreciate
rapidly, and managerial knowhow will be determined by individuals’ innate talent only.
The most talented individuals become entrepreneurs, allocation of talent is optimal, the
externality is positive and technological growth remains high.
I first calibrate this model to West Germany before reunification, in particular to pin
down the key parameters governing the role of parental background and the link between
entrepreneurship and growth. I then present an extended version of the model economy
that captures the integration of East into West Germany. While both Germanies share
capital and goods markets, labor markets are locally separated. The government fixes
wages in East Germany above labor productivity and as fractions of West German wages
and finances a lower rental rate of capital for East Germany. Individuals can pay a moving
cost and work or set up a business in the other part of Germany.12 Since wages are set
above labor productivity, becoming an entrepreneur is not attractive and East Germans
choose to work instead of setting up their own business. While East Germans’ general
skills are comparable to those of West Germans, their average managerial knowhow is
lower than that of many West Germans who have learned from their parents how to run
11Zero correlation of talent between parents and children is a strong assumption. While I will not
provide results for alternative assumptions on this correlation, in the course of this paper however, I will
indicate and discuss the effects of this assumption on calibration and results.
12I abstain from the possibility of commuting; i.e. for instance living in East Germany and working in
West Germany. This seems to be a common choice for East Germans (Hunt [2006]). However, for most
individuals commuting is a temporary occupational choice as they commute for a limited amount of time
and/or as students, while in the model of this paper occupational and migration choices are permanent.
4
a business.13 Furthermore and despite investment aids for setting up businesses in East
Germany, most talented East Germans migrate to West Germany to set up businesses
there. They thus contribute to growth in West Germany, whereas in East Germany few
mediocre entrepreneurs imply low economic growth. Given too many workers and too
few entrepreneurs in an environment where wages are fixed, there is involuntary unem-
ployment in East Germany. Counterfactual experiments show that had East Germany
integrated into a social mobile West Germany, or had East German wages been flexible,
or had migration between East and West Germany been restricted, there would be more
entrepreneurs, less unemployment as well as higher economic growth in East Germany.
However, while flexible wages and a socially mobile West Germany would have also led to
more output and higher economic growth for all of Germany, migration restrictions are
exclusively beneficial to East German output and economic growth.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper builds on Hassler and Rodr´ıguez Mora [2000]. The authors bring forward
various empirical evidence on the negative relation between rates of technological and
economic growth and the value of parental background. This relationship implies a pos-
itive relation between rates of technological and economic growth and higher intergen-
erational social and occupational mobility. Kuznets [1966] writes on this matter :“One
would tend to assume that internal income mobility is more limited in stagnant or slowly
growing countries, than in those showing rapid growth; and there are implications also for
the trends in income mobility over the long span of growth within a country.”(pg.205).14
Both relationships between economic growth and social mobility and economic growth
and parental background arise in the model of this paper and have also been subject
to a larger literature on economic growth, social mobility, and the allocation of talent.15
While entrepreneurial parental background has a positive effect on entrepreneurship on
the individual level, it negatively affects aggregate variables, as little intergenerational
occupational and social mobility is associated with low economic growth.16 Caselli and
13 Krueger and Pischke [1995] estimate very similar coefficients for returns to years of schooling for
West Germans and East Germans working in West Germany.
14According to Olson [1982] a rigid social class structure and low economic growth are just two different
ways in which a misallocation of talent due to rent seeking manifests itself in a society.
15A seminal paper on the optimal allocation of talent and economic growth is Murphy et al [1991].
Recently, the topic of the allocation of resources across productive units and its implications for produc-
tivity and growth has received a great deal of attention, see e.g. Hsieh and Klenow [2009], Guner et
al [2008], and Restuccia and Rogerson [2008] among others.
16There is a large empirical literature on the determinants of entrepreneurship. Having had a parent
who was an entrepreneur is found to have a positive effect on oneself setting up one’s own business.
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Gennaioli [2012] provide a model where missing markets result in the prevalence of dy-
nastic firms. As in this paper, managers being selected according to their family ties
rather than their talent leads to lower total factor productivity. In Galor and Tsid-
don [1997], similar to this paper, parental background and growth are negatively related
and as technology adoption evolves, parental background gains importance, wages become
more equal, and technological progress slows down. In the model of this paper a posi-
tive value for parental background in entrepreneurship inhibits an optimal allocation of
talent that would maximize the externality of talented entrepreneurs on economic growth.
As in the recent literature on cross-border flows of managerial talent, the model of this
paper allows for entrepreneurs to set up their business in the other part of Germany. How-
ever, unlike results in Burnstein and Monge [2009] managerial talent does not flow from
West Germany, a region with large ’firm-embedded productivity’ towards East Germany
where labor is abundant, because East German wages are set above labor productivity.
And even though the immediate implementation of West German regulations in East Ger-
many makes both regions’ entrepreneurial environments alike, West Germans do not set
up businesses in East Germany. Managerial talent moving towards similar environments
as in Pica and Rodr´ıguez Mora [2007] is again obscured by the wage setting policy in East
Germany. This paper is also related to the vast literature that discusses East Germany’s
disappointing growth experience. Hunt [2008] provides a recent review of this literature.
There is a general consensus that the wage setting policy has been the main cause for
East Germany’s high unemployment rates (see e.g. Akerlof et al [1991] and Sinn [2002]).17
According to Snower and Merkl [2006] high unemployment rates in East Germany are a
consequence of the wage setting policy in combination with generous welfare provisions.
Canova and Ravn [2000] also assign an important role to welfare provisions in magnifying
the contraction of output and employment caused by differences in skill level and capital
endowment of East and West Germans. Burda and Hunt [2001] claim a dampening effect
of the wage-setting policy on migration. In the framework of a labor search model, Uh-
lig [2006] argues that little networking due to a lack of established production leads to a
low productivity and high out-migration scenario in East Germany. Apart from the paper
by Canova and Ravn [2000] none of these authors provide general equilibrium models for
East Germany’s economic experience.
This paper contributes to the literature by being the first one, to the best of my knowledge,
Dunn and Holtz-Eakin [1996] find intergenerational linkage in self-employment to be stronger along non-
financial lines than along financial lines. Arenius and Minniti [2005] find that simply knowing other
entrepreneurs is positively and significantly related to being a nascent entrepreneur.
17In addition, fixed wages impeded an offsetting of initial effects of the currency union between West
and East Germany.
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that explicitly models the link between a lack of entrepreneurship and low economic
growth in East Germany.18 In the framework of a general equilibrium model it applies
the theory established by the literature on social mobility and economic growth to the
context of economic transition. From the historical unique context of a generation without
parental background in entrepreneurship arises the natural question of its implications
for economic growth. This paper tries to address this question and to provide some
quantification of the implications for the case of East Germany.19 The remaining of this
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model which is then calibrated
to West German data before 1989. An extended version of the model with features of the
reunification of East and West Germany is presented in Section 3. This extended model
is then calibrated to data after reunification and its results are presented and discussed
in Section 4. Section 5 presents the counterfactual experiments. Section 6 concludes.
2 Basic Model (West Germany before Reunification)
Each period the economy is inhabited by a continuum of individuals of mass one. Individ-
uals differ in initial endowments of capital inherited from their parents and in managerial
knowhow. Managerial knowhow is composed of innate talent and parental background.
An individual’s parental background refers to his parent’s occupation of either having
been an entrepreneur or having been a worker. According to their managerial knowhow
individuals chose to become entrepreneurs or workers. Entrepreneurs produce a homo-
geneous good by using labor, capital, and their knowhow as inputs. Individuals live for
one period, during which they receive their parents’ bequests, make optimal occupational
choices, lend or borrow capital, work, consume, and pass on bequests to their children.
Each individual has one parent and is replaced by one child of random talent. Each
period there is a mass L0t individuals whose parents were workers, and a mass L
1
t indi-
viduals whose parents were entrepreneurs, with L0t + L
1
t = 1. The government in this
economy manages an unemployment insurance and collects taxes to finance government
consumption.
18A recent paper by Bajona and Locay [2009] considers the period before transition and establishes a
similar link between a reduced stock of managerial knowledge and low growth rates for planned economies.
19Conceptually this paper is also related to studies that exploit the incidence of economic transition as
a natural experiment to study entrepreneurship as e.g. Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln [2009] and Burchardi and Has-
san [2010]. While these papers are empirical studies, the current paper exploits this fact in a theoretical
framework.
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Preferences An individual born in period t derives utility from personal consumption,
ct, and bequests, bt, left to his child
U(ct, bt) = c
ω
t b
1−ω
t , (2.1)
with 0 < ω < 1. The parameter ω reflects the importance of personal consumption for an
individual’s utility relative to bequests left to children.
Endowments Each individual has one unit of productive time that he supplies in-
elastically. In addition he is endowed with the bequest from his parent, denoted by xt.
Individuals also differ in their managerial knowhow (zt).
Managerial Knowhow Managerial knowhow is composed of innate talent (q) and
parental background (p). Innate talent is independent and identically distributed across
time and individuals in Q = (0, q¯], with cdf F (q) and density f(q). Parental background
is a variable that is equal to one if one’s parent was an entrepreneur and zero otherwise,
p ∈ {0, 1}. Managerial knowhow is defined as the product of innate talent, (q) and
parental background, (p)
zpt = q(1 + φtp),
where φt ≥ 0 reflects the value that being an entrepreneur’s child has for an individual’s
managerial knowhow in period t. The basic idea is that an entrepreneur passes on infor-
mation to his child about how to run a business. This private information enhances an
individual’s managerial knowhow.
Production Every entrepreneur has access to the same technology. He uses his man-
agerial knowhow (zpt ), employs workers of efficiency units (nt), and rents capital (kt) to
produce a single output (yt) used for consumption and bequests
yt = F (z
p
t , nt, kt) = At(z
p
t )
1−γ+κ(kνt n
1−ν
t )
γ, (2.2)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the span-of-control parameter and κ > 0 determines the curvature
of the entrepreneur’s profit function.20 The capital share of production is given by νγ ∈
(0, 1). Capital depreciates at rate δ and At is total factor productivity (TFP) which grows
at rate gt.
20In the original Lucas’ [1978] span-of-control model wages are constant in talent and κ is equal to
zero. Following Chang [2000], in the current paper unemployment benefits are constant, wages are linearly
increasing in talent, and thus profits need to increase more than linearly with talent, which requires setting
κ > 0.
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Value of Parental Background Following Hassler and Rodr´ıguez Mora [2000] the
value of parental background, φt+1 is defined as a decreasing function of the TFP growth
rate
φt+1 = a(gt), (2.3)
with a(gt) ≥ 0 and ∂a(gt)∂gt < 0.21 Fast technological change implies that today resembles
yesterday less and that the value of private information inherited from parents is being
reduced. When TFP growth is high, past information about how to run a business
becomes completely worthless and everyone’s managerial knowhow is solely defined by
their innate talent
lim
gt→∞
a(gt) = 0.
Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs choose optimal amounts of labor and capital in order
to maximize their profits net of income taxes (τ). For any efficiency unit of labor hired
entrepreneurs contribute τut wt to the unemployment insurance. Given a wage rate (wt)
and a rental rate for capital (Rt), the entrepreneurs’ problem is
max
{nt,kt}
Πt = (1− τ)[At(zpt )1−γ+κ(kνt n1−νt )γ − (1 + τut )wtnt −Rtkt]. (2.4)
Combining the two first order conditions of this maximization problem, the optimal
capital-labor ratio for entrepreneurs is given by
kt
nt
=
ν
1− ν
(1 + τut )wt
Rt
, (2.5)
which is increasing in the contribution to the unemployment insurance (τut ). Entrepreneurs’
profits are given by
pit(z
p
t ; .) = (1− τ)(1− γ)A
1
1−γ
t (z
p
t )
1−γ+κ
1−γ
(
γ(1− ν)
(1 + τut )wt
) γ
1−γ
(
ν
1− ν
(1 + τut )wt
Rt
) νγ
1−γ
. (2.6)
Higher wages (wt), higher income taxes (τ), higher contributions to the unemployment
insurance (τut ), as well as higher rental rates for capital (Rt), and a larger span-of-control
parameter (γ) all reduce entrepreneurs’ profits. A higher level of managerial knowhow
(zpt ) on the other hand, increases profits of entrepreneurs. Since
∂zpt
∂φt
≥ 0, profits are also
increasing in the value of entrepreneurial parental background. Given the negative rela-
tion between the TFP growth rate and the value of entrepreneurial parental background
(see Equation 2.3), low technological growth today implies higher profits for children of
entrepreneurs in the future.
21Instead, φt could be defined as a decreasing function of output growth. Given that the steady-state
growth rate of TFP is equal to (1−νγ) times the growth rate of output, results will most likely be similar.
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Workers Workers supply their efficiency units of labor inelastically. Their talent (q)
is transformed linearly into efficiency units of labor so that their net wage as workers is
given by
(1− τut − τ)wtq. (2.7)
Workers also pay income taxes (τ). Mimicking the German unemployment insurance,
both employers and workers contribute the same fraction τut of workers’ gross wages to
the insurance scheme.22
Unemployed Unemployed individuals receive a fraction ς of the wage rate per efficiency
unit as unemployment benefits (vt)
vt = ςwt,
which are paid independently of an individual’s talent.
Occupational Choices Individuals compare their potential wage to the profits they
can make as entrepreneurs. Whenever, pit(z
p
t ; .) ≥ (1− τut − τ)wtq, they set up their own
business. Given zpt = q(1 + φtp), the cut-off value of innate talent (qˆ
p
t ) describing the
individual who is indifferent between working or setting up a business is given by
qˆpt =
(
(1 + φtp)
−(1+γ+κ)
1−γ w
1−νγ
1−γ
t R
νγ
1−γ
t Ψ
−1
t (1− τ)−1(1 + τut )
γ−νγ
1−γ (1− τut − τ)
) 1−γ
κ
,
where Ψt = A
1
1−γ
t (1− γ)(γ(1− ν))
γ
(1−γ) ( ν
1−ν )
νγ
1−γ . This threshold is decreasing in the value
of entrepreneurial parental background. Individuals whose parents were entrepreneurs set
up a business at a lower level of innate talent than individuals whose parents were workers.
When TFP grows fast, the value of entrepreneurial parental background vanishes (φt → 0)
and the difference in talent between the two marginal entrepreneurs from different family
backgrounds disappears. Higher wages make being a worker more attractive relative to
being an entrepreneur. A higher rental rate for capital and higher wages (as long as the
capital share is restricted to be smaller than unity, νγ < 1) reduce entrepreneurial profits
and increase the threshold of occupational choice, leading to fewer entrepreneurs. Both,
income taxes (τ) and the contribution to the unemployment insurance (τut ) have ambigu-
ous effects on the occupational choice of individuals. While they reduce both, wages of
workers and profits of entrepreneurs, the latter are affected less by an increase in any of
the two because contributions to the unemployment insurance are part of labor costs and
22For any worker of type q, a firm contributes τut wtq to unemployment insurance and pays to the worker
a gross wage of wtq, of which the government automatically collects a fraction (1 − τut − τ) for income
tax and unemployment insurance.
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as thus deductible from profit taxes. Higher income taxes (as long as ν < 1) and higher
contributions to the unemployment insurance thus reduce the threshold of occupational
choice, leading to more entrepreneurs. Individuals then compare unemployment benefits
(vt) to their potential wage. The marginal worker, the individual with talent q
?
t is indif-
ferent between working or being unemployed q?t =
ς
(1−τut −τ) . This threshold is independent
of both the wage rate and an individual’s parental background.
Figure 2.1 displays these thresholds of occupational choice for individuals from an en-
trepreneurial family background and those from a working family background. Individu-
als with talent lower than q?t find it optimal to stay unemployed while those with talent
between q?t and qˆ
1
t become workers. Individuals with talent higher than qˆ
1
t and parental
background in entrepreneurship set up a business while those of equal talent but lacking
parental background in entrepreneurship become workers. Everyone of talent higher than
qˆ0t decides to become an entrepreneur.
Figure 2.1: Thresholds of Occupational Choice
Workers
Entrepreneurs whose
parents were
entrepreneurs
1ˆtq
qwt
lu
t )1( ττ −−
;.),( 1 ttt Azπ
;.),( 0 ttt Azπ
0ˆtq
Workers whose parents
were workers
Entrepreneurs
q
tv
Unemployed
∗
tq
The Individual’s Problem An individual born in period t receives his bequest (xt)
and chooses an optimal occupation that determines how he will employ his labor endow-
ment and his bequest. The individual then is unemployed, works, or runs a business.
Finally he consumes and leaves a bequest to his child. Formally the individual chooses
11
{ct, bt, Iq<q? , Iq?t<q<qˆpt , Iq>qˆpt } in order to maximize Equation 2.1 subject to
ct + bt = xt(1 +Rt − δ) + vtIq<q? + (1− τut − τ)wtIq?t<q<qˆpt + pit(z
p
t ; .)Iq>qˆpt ),
where Iq<q? ,Iq?t<q<qˆ
p
t
, and Iq>qˆpt are indicator functions that take on value one if the individ-
ual’s talent is lower than q?t , between q
?
t and qˆ
p
t , or larger than qˆ
p
t , respectively. Individuals
can lend their bequests to firms at the competitive rental rate, Rt. The first order condi-
tions of the individual’s problem give rise to the following two optimal decisions:
ct(z
p
t ; .) = ω[xt(1 +Rt − δ) + vtIq<q? + (1− τut − τ)wtIq?t<q<qˆpt + pit(z
p
t ; .)Iq>qˆpt
,
bt(z
p
t ; .) = (1− ω)[xt(1 +Rt − δ) + vtIq<q? + (1− τut − τ)wtIq?t<q<qˆpt + pit(z
p
t ; .)Iq>qˆpt
.
The individual spends a fraction ω of his income on consumption and leaves the rest as a
bequest to his child. In addition to these two optimal decisions the solution to the indi-
vidual’s problem includes his optimal occupational choice. Given their talent, individuals
can choose to set up their own business, to become workers, or to be unemployed. Note
that given perfect capital markets the individual’s bequest does not affect his occupational
choice. Given perfect foresight, individuals compare among potential incomes from the
three occupations and choose the one that maximizes their income.23
2.1 Aggregate Economy
Aggregate Capital Supply Each period the economy’s aggregate capital stock (Xt)
is determined by the sum of all bequests from last period
Xt = L
0
t−1
∫ z¯0
0
bt−1(z0t−1; .)f(q)dq + L
1
t−1
∫ z¯1t−1
0
bt−1(z1t−1; .)f(q)dq, (2.8)
where bt−1 represents bequest decisions taken last period. Last period’s individuals were
either children of workers L0t−1 or children of entrepreneurs L
1
t−1.
24
Growth Rate The TFP growth rate is defined as a one-period percentage change in
the level of TFP
gt =
At − At−1
At−1
.
23Note that parents do not take into account that becoming an entrepreneur generates a value of
parental background and thus a possibly higher managerial knowhow for their children.
24Given perfect capital markets and the warm glow motive for bequests in agents’ utility, there is no
need to follow the joint distribution of wealth and managerial knowhow in this economy.
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Following Hassler and Rodr´ıguez Mora [2000], the TFP growth rate is a positive function
of the innate talent of last period’s entrepreneurs relative to the size of the population
gt = h(Q¯t−1),
where
Q¯t−1 = L0t−1
∫ z¯0
zˆ0t−1
qf(q)dq + L1t−1
∫ z¯1t−1
zˆ1t−1
qf(q)dq,
and with h being some increasing function in Q¯t−1.25 The innate talent of last period’s
entrepreneurs is the sum of innate talent of entrepreneurs who are children of workers L0t−1
and those who are children of entrepreneurs L1t−1. Given these two groups of individuals
and a fixed fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy, Q¯t−1 is maximized by assigning
occupations such that marginal entrepreneurs from both parental backgrounds coincide.
However, in case the value of parental background is high, the marginal entrepreneur with
an entrepreneurial family background will be of lower talent and given a fixed fraction
of entrepreneurs in the economy aggregate innate talent of entrepreneurs will not be
maximized. The individual’s occupational choice thus exerts a negative externality on
the economy’s growth rate.
Government The government collects income taxes from entrepreneurs and workers
and uses them for pure government consumption. Contributions to the unemployment
insurance scheme from both workers and entrepreneurs have to be such as to fully finance
benefits paid to the unemployed in each period. Each period the government has to fulfill
the following two constraints
Gt = τ{L1t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ1t
(yt − wt(1 + τut )nt −Rtkt)f(q)dq +
+ L0t
∫ z¯0
zˆ0t
(yt − wt(1 + τut )nt −Rtkt)f(q)dq +
+ L1t
∫ zˆ1t
qˆt
wtqf(q)dq + L
0
t
∫ zˆ0t
qˆt
wtqf(q)dq}, (2.9)
25Hassler and Rodr´ıguez Mora [2000] reason the positive relationship between entrepreneurs’ innate
talent and TFP growth as follows: ‘the higher the individual entrepreneur’s ability to learn or under-
stand or to deal with new or trying situations, the larger will the individual’s technological innovations
be. This will create a feedback mechanism whereby rapid technology growth creates an environment
in which the sorting of individuals to entrepreneurial positions is based on intelligence, not on social
background.”(pg.889). Note that population size is unity.
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and
vt
∫ qˆt
0
f(q)dq = 2τut wt
(
L0t
∫ zˆ0t
qˆt
qf(q)dq + L1t
∫ zˆ1t
qˆt
qf(q)dq
)
. (2.10)
Equilibrium We can now define a competitive equilibrium for the model economy.
Given an initial capital stock, X0, an initial fraction of entrepreneurs L
1
0, and their talent,
Q¯−1, a government policy, {τ, ς}, and a sequence of prices for labor and capital {wt, Rt}∞0 ,
a competitive equilibrium is a collection of sequences {ct(zpt ; .), bt(zpt ; .), zˆpt , qˆt, τut , Gt}∞0 for
p ∈ {0, 1} such that:
1. {ct(zpt ; .), bt(zpt ; .), zˆpt , qˆt}∞0 solves the individual’s problem for each p ∈ {0, 1} and for
each t;
2. all three markets, for goods, capital, and labor clear, i.e. equations (2.11)-(2.13)
hold for all t;
3. {(τut }∞0 is such that the unemployment insurance is self-financing, equation 2.10
holds for all t;
4. {Gt}∞0 is such that equation 2.9 holds for all t.
In equilibrium all three markets for goods, capital, and labor must clear. Labor supply is
given by the productive time of those individuals who are neither entrepreneurs nor opt
for unemployment. Denote by nt(z
p
t ; .) and kt(z
p
t ; .) optimal demands for labor and capital
services by an entrepreneur born in period t who has managerial knowhow zpt . Then for
the labor market to clear we require aggregate labor demand
Ndt = L
0
t
∫ z¯0
zˆ0t
nt(z
0
t ; .)f(q)dq + L
1
t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ1t
nt(z
1
t ; .)f(q)dq, (2.11)
to be equal to aggregate labor supply N st = L
0
t
∫ zˆ0t
qˆt
qf(q)dq + L1t
∫ zˆ1t
qˆt
qf(q)dq.
For the capital market to clear we require aggregate capital demand to equal aggregate
capital supply
Kdt = L
0
t
∫ z¯0
zˆ0t
kt(z
0
t ; .)f(q)dq + L
1
t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ1t
kt(z
1
t ; .)f(q)dq = Xt. (2.12)
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With yt(z
p
t ; .) being the supply of goods by any entrepreneur of knowhow z
p
t , for market
clearing in the goods market we require
L0t
∫ z¯0
zˆ0t
yt(z
0
t ; .)f(q)dq + L
1
t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ1t
yt(z
1
t ; .)f(q)dq =
= L0t
∫ z¯0
0
(ct(z
0
t ; .) + bt(z
0
t ; .))f(q)dq + L
1
t
∫ z¯1t
0
(ct(z
1
t ; .) + bt(z
1
t ; .))f(q)dq −
−Xt(1− δ) +Gt. (2.13)
Aggregate consumption, bequests, and government consumption have to equal the sum
of aggregate production and the depreciated capital stock.
2.2 Calibration
Before presenting the extended version of the model economy that describes the reuni-
fication of West and East Germany, I first calibrate the basic model economy to West
Germany before reunification. I fix parameter values for preferences and technology and
pin down key parameters governing the role of parental background and the link between
entrepreneurship and growth. Some parameters are assigned values based on a-priori
information, while others are calibrated to match certain statistics of the West German
economy before reunification. I also specify the function h(Q¯t−1) that relates innate talent
of entrepreneurs and TFP growth and the function a(gt), relating TFP growth and the
value of parental background for entrepreneurship.26
Fixing Parameter Values For the mean log-talent (µ) and its dispersion (σ), I use
values of 2.11 and 0.58 respectively as estimated by Chang [2000] using the US wage
distribution for non-supervisory workers. A more regulated German labor market and
lower labor-market participation by low-skilled individuals make the use of a West German
wage distribution less adequate for estimating a distribution of talents. Factors other than
underlying talent lead to a higher mean and lower variation in wages.27 The US wage
distribution, since it is less contaminated by policies, seems to be a better reflection
of individuals’ talent. The span-of-control parameter (γ) is set to 0.865. Using 3-digit
industry data, Burnside et al [1995] estimate returns to scale in production to lie between
0.81 and 0.92. I choose the midpoint of their values. Taking the average over annual values
for 1970-1989 for the ratio of depreciation of fixed private capital over gross private capital
stock gives me an annual depreciation rate (δ) of 4.6% (Statistisches Bundesamt [2006]).
26One period in this economy is equivalent to approximately one generation - 20 years.
27Gernandt and Pfeiffer [2007] estimate a wage distribution for West Germany for gross hourly wages
for prime age dependent male workers for 1984-1989, with mean 2.42 and standard deviation 0.118.
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Table 2.2: Parameters
Mean Log Talent (µ) 2.11
Dispersion in Log Talent (σ) 0.58
Span-of-Control (γ) 0.865
Annual Depreciation Rate (δ) 0.046
Parameter for Function Relating Entrepreneurs’ Talent to Growth ( α ) 0.22
Parameter for Function Relating Growth to Value of Parental Background ( φ¯ ) 0.957
Importance of Capital (ν) 0.3468
Relative Importance of Consumption in Utility (ω) 0.8035
Unemployment Benefit (ς) 2.649
Curvature of Profit Function(κ) 0.101
Income Tax (τ) 0.175
Functional Forms and Calibration The two center pieces of the model economy
are i)the function relating entrepreneurs’ innate talent to technological growth and ii)the
function relating technological growth to the value of entrepreneurial parental background
for managerial knowhow. The model’s results are essentially determined by the functional
forms and parameter values assigned to these functions. Careful calibration is thus crucial
for obtaining sensible results for the basic model as well as for the extended version of the
model economy. I specify the function h(Q¯t−1) relating innate talent of entrepreneurs to
the growth rate of TFP as follows:
gt = h(Q¯t−1) =
1
(1 + e−Q¯t−1)1/α
.
To obtain a positive relationship between innate talent of entrepreneurs and technological
growth, α ≥ 0 has to hold. I choose α equal to 0.22 to match that between 1971 and 1989
real West German GDP per capita grew at an average annual rate of 2.26% (Statistisches
Bundesamt [2006]). Finally, I specify the function a(gt) that relates TFP growth to the
value of entrepreneurial parental background
φt+1 = a(gt) =
φ¯
1 + gt
,
where φ¯ is a parameter. This parameter is assigned a value of 0.957 to match the inter-
generational persistence in occupations.28 According to Pistrui et al [2000] 60% of West
German entrepreneurs have a parent who had been an entrepreneur. I set the calibra-
tion target for the percentage of entrepreneurs whose parents were entrepreneurs to 60%.
Table 2.2 reports all parameter values.
28Zero correlation of talent between parents and children requires assigning a relatively high value to
φ¯ in order to be able to account for the persistence in occupations.
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Table 2.3: Calibration Targets
Data Model
Average Annual Growth Rate of GDP (1971-1989) 2.26% 2.26%
Percentage of Entrepreneur with Entrepreneurial Parent (1997) 60% 60%
Capital Share (1970-1989) 0.3 0.3
Capital-Output Ratio (1970-1989) 2.32 2.32
Unemployment Rate (1970-1989) 5.4% 5.4%
Business Ownership Rate (1972-1989) 6.9% 6.9%
Tax Revenues to GDP (1975-1990) 12.2% 12.2%
The remaining five parameters are chosen to match the first five calibration targets of
Table 2.3. The importance of capital (ν) is calibrated to a value of 0.3468 in order to target
a capital share of 0.3 as reported by the Deutsche Bundesbank [2001] for West Germany
for 1970 to 1989. The parameter for the relative importance of consumption in utility
(ω) is assigned a value of 0.8035 to match an average annual capital-output ratio of 2.32
for West Germany for 1970-1989 (Statistisches Bundesamt [2006]). The unemployment
benefit as a fraction of the wage rate per efficiency unit (ς) is calibrated to 2.649 in order
to target an average unemployment rate of 5.4% for West Germany between 1970 and
1989 (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit [2007]).29 The parameter for the curvature of the profit
function (κ) is assigned a value of 0.101 to match the fraction of entrepreneurs in the
model to a business ownership rate of 6.9%, as estimated by Entrepreneurs International
(Compendia [2002]) for West Germany for 1972 to 1989.30 The parameter for the income
tax rate (τ) is calibrated to a value of 0.175 to match the ratio of tax revenues to GDP in
the model to taxes on income and profits as percentage of GDP of 12.2% for West Germany
for 1975 to 1990 (OECD [2006]). I simulate the model economy until convergence to a
balanced growth path. The model hits its calibration targets of Table 2.3 well.
In addition, the model is also able to generate statistics on average firm size, unemploy-
ment benefits to mean nominal wage, and contributions to unemployment insurance in
line with data. Table 2.4 presents additional steady state results for the basic model
representing West Germany before reunification. On average, entrepreneurs are twice as
talented as the average individual, and entrepreneurs from a working family background
are 2.4 times as talented as entrepreneurs from an entrepreneurial family background.
Having had a parent who was an entrepreneur increases one’s managerial knowhow by
29I use the official unemployment rate because unofficial unemployment rates are not available for years
prior to 1993 (active labor market schemes have mostly been in place since 1990).
30In this data set business owners include self-employed and owners/managers of incorporated busi-
nesses whose income includes profits as well as a salary. Unpaid family workers are excluded. The business
ownership rate is constructed by dividing the number of business owners by the total labor force. Data
is available from 1972 onwards.
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Table 2.4: Additional Steady State Average Results: Annual Values
Entrepreneurship
Working Background Individuals Becoming Entrepreneurs 3.0%
Entrepreneurs Accumulative Talent (Q¯t) 1.4
Relative Average Intelligence of Entrepreneurs 2.2
Av. Talent of Entrepreneurs from Working vs. Entrepreneurial Background 2.4
Value of Entrepreneurial Parental Background 0.7
West Germany before Reunification
Growth Rate of TFP 1.57%
Annual Rental Rate of Capital 6.6%
Average Firm Size (Workers) 12.7
Contribution to Unemployment Insurance 0.87%
Unemployment Benefit as Fraction of Mean Nominal Wage 28.3%
around 70%, (φ = 0.70). Only 3% of individuals from a working family background set
up their own business, compared to 60% of individuals whose parents were entrepreneurs.
TFP grows at an annual rate of 1.57%. The annual rental rate of capital in the model is
6.6%, somewhat higher than the deflated average of German government long-term bond
yields over 1970-1989 of 5.2% (IMF and Heston et al. [2011] and United Nations Statistics
Division [2010]). The model generates an average firm size of 12.7 workers per firm which
is slightly higher than data suggests. Entrepreneurs International (Compendia [2002])
indicate that between 1972 and 1989 the average West German firm had approximately
11 employees. The ratio of unemployment benefits to mean nominal wage in the model is
28.3% and thus comes very close to the ratio of monthly social subsidies to the monthly
nominal average equivalent income of 0.29 for West Germany for 1991(Bundesministerium
fu¨r Arbeit und Soziales [2008]and DIW [1995]).31 Contributions to unemployment insur-
ance with employers and employees each paying 0.87% of gross wages result somewhat
lower in the model than in the data. According to Glismann and Schrader [2002] con-
tributions to unemployment insurance by each employer and employee in West Germany
between 1970 and 1989 were equal to 1.45% of gross income.
31According to a letter from the Bundesministerium fu¨r Arbeit und Soziales, equivalent data for the
time period 1970 to 1989 is not available.
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3 Extended Model (Reunified Germany)
Having presented the basic framework I will now extent the model economy to account for
aspects of reunification in order to be able to address the two main questions of this paper:
Did East Germany’s integration into an established economy - West Germany - hinder a
fruitful development of entrepreneurship? And did the resulting lack of entrepreneurship
affect economic growth in East Germany?
In this paper, the German reunification is modeled as the economic integration of a smaller
region into a larger one. Both regions share common goods and capital markets, but their
labor markets are locally separated. The government fixes wages in East Germany at
a fraction (1 − λt) of West German wages and governmental investment aids lower the
rental rate for capital in East Germany to R∗t = (1 − χt)Rt. Initially, TFP in East
Germany is lower than in West Germany (A∗t < At). The economy’s aggregate capital
stock is given by the sum of the two capital stocks. In contrast to West Germans, all
East Germans of the first generation after reunification are children of workers. Paying
a fixed moving cost individuals can opt for working or setting up a business in the other
part of Germany.32 In each region there is a fraction of θ individuals who are mobile and
a fraction of (1 − θ) individuals who are immobile. Immobile individuals face infinitely
high moving costs (ηht =∞) and more mobile individuals face lower moving costs (ηlt).33
The distribution of innate talent f(q), is identical for East and West Germans. Upon
reunification West Germans can migrate to East Germany and set up a business there,
taking advantage of the lower labor cost and a lower rental rate of capital. However, TFP
in East Germany is lower and moving requires the payment of a fixed cost. No West
German migrates to East Germany to work there, as wages in East Germany are lower.
For East Germans, reunification implies free occupational choices. They can decide to
set up their own business, to become a worker, to be unemployed, or they can migrate to
West Germany to work or to set up a business there.34
32Individuals migrate with their children and thus depending on migration and occupational choices
made by the first generation of East Germans, their offspring will be East or West German children of
workers or entrepreneurs.
33I introduce this additional heterogeneity to account for reasons other than wage differentials or
education (here ≈ innate talent) that induce migration decisions from East to West Germany, e.g. age,
family ties (see e.g. Burda [1993])
34East German unemployed receive the same benefits as West German unemployed, hence for them the
option to migrate to West Germany is never better than staying in East Germany, given that migration
is costly. As of 2007, social welfare benefits are the same in East and West Germany but already in 1992
East German benefits were just 4% below those of West Germany (Bundesministerium fu¨r Arbeit und
Soziales [2008]).
19
East German Workers East Germans have full knowledge of the wage setting policy.
With a certain probability ψt, they rationally expect to be involuntarily unemployed when
choosing to work in East Germany.35 East German workers earn a fraction (1−λt) of West
German wages and both voluntary and involuntary unemployed East Germans receive
unemployment benefits vt.
36 Thus expected income of those staying in East Germany to
work is given by
(1− ψt)(1− τut − τ)(1− λt)wtq + ψtvt. (3.14)
East Germans who migrate to West Germany to work there earn the same wage as West
Germans, less a moving cost η∗,jt
(1− τut − τ)wtq − η∗,jt . (3.15)
East German Entrepreneurs East German entrepreneurs face the following profit
maximization problem
max
{nt,kt}
Πt = (1− τ)[A∗t (zpt )1−γ+κ(kνt n1−νt )γ − (1− λt)(1 + τut )wtnt − (1− χt)Rtkt]. (3.16)
Bigger differences between East and West German wages (λt), and East and West German
rental rates of capital (χt) increase profits of East German entrepreneurs. Denote their
optimal profits by pit(z
p
t , A
∗
t ; .). East Germans who set up a business in West Germany
face the following profit maximization problem
max
{nt,kt}
Πt = (1− τ)[At(zpt )1−γ+κ(kνt n1−νt )γ − (1 + τut )wtnt −Rtkt − η∗,jt ]. (3.17)
Higher moving costs (η∗,jt ) reduce profits of East Germans who set up a business in West
Germany. Higher West German TFP (At) on the other hand, increases their profits. De-
note their optimal profits by pit(z
p
t , At, η
∗,j
t ; .). East Germans compare potential incomes
from being unemployed, working or setting up a business in East Germany, and working
or setting up a business in West Germany.
Figure 3.2 displays one possible realization of four thresholds of occupational choice for
mobile East Germans of the first generation after reunification. East German individu-
als compare their potential wage in West Germany to the wage they can earn in East
35One might argue that initially East Germans did not have any notion of unemployment as many
authors have described that under the communist regimes, the “threat of unemployment was therefore
virtually nil[...]” (Roland [2000], pg.9). However, given that periods are equal to one generation the model
cannot accommodate a process of learning during one’s lifetime and thus it seems sensible to assume that
East German’s form rational expectations.
36Note that given this uncertainty, the problem for an East German individual thus corresponds to
maximizing his expected utility, Et[U(ct, bt)].
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Germany. The cut-off value, q˜∗,lt describes the mobile East German individual who is in-
different between working in East or West Germany, while the cut-off value qˆ∗,0,lt describes
the East German mobile individual who is indifferent between working in West Germany
or setting up a business in East Germany. Finally, the cut-off value, qˆ∗˜,0,lt describes the
mobile East German individual who is indifferent between setting up his business in East
or West Germany
Figure 3.2: Possible thresholds for occupational choice for mobile East Germans of first
generation after reunification.
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West German entrepreneurs Given a fixed cost for moving from West to East Ger-
many (ηjt ) with j ∈ {h, l}, a wage rate for East Germany (1−λt)wt, and a reduced rental
rate for capital (1 − χt)Rt, the problem of a West German who sets up his business in
East Germany is
max
{nt,kt}
Πt = (1−τ)[A∗t (zpt )1−γ+κ(kνt n1−νt )γ−(1−λt)(1+τut )wtnt−(1−χt)Rtkt−ηjt ]. (3.18)
Smaller discounts on wages (λt) and on the rental rate of capital (χt) as well as higher
moving costs (ηjt ), reduce profits of West Germans who set up their businesses in East
Germany.37 Their optimal profits are denoted by pit(z
p
t , A
∗
t , η
j
t ; .). Individuals in West
Germany compare their potential profits from setting up a business in East Germany to
37Moving costs are assumed to be deductible from profit taxes.
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the potential incomes resulting from the previously discussed occupations. They compare
profits from setting up a business in East Germany (Equation 3.18) to profits they can
make as entrepreneurs in West Germany (Equation 2.6). Only if the discount on wages
and the discount on the rental rate of capital are large enough to offset the reduced TFP
in East Germany do West German individuals prefer to set up a business in East Germany
over setting it up in West Germany. If discounts are too small, or differences in TFP are
large, no West German individual opts for setting up his business in East Germany. In
this case, or if moving costs are very large, or if there are no mobile individuals, thresholds
of occupational choices for West Germans after reunification remain unaltered and are as
displayed in Figure 2.1.
3.1 Aggregate Economy
Lemma 3.1. There exists no equilibrium after reunification in which both, West and East
German individuals become entrepreneurs in both, East and West Germany.
There will hence only exist equilibria with either East Germans setting up businesses
in East and West Germany or West Germans setting up businesses in East and West
Germany (see the Appendix A.5 for a proof).
Growth Rates The growth rate of East German TFP is defined as a positive function
of the innate talent of entrepreneurs setting up a business in East Germany (Q¯∗t) relative
to P ∗t+1, the East German population of next period, i.e. after migration decisions have
been taken
g∗t+1 = h(Q¯
∗
t/P
∗
t+1).
Analogously, the growth rate of West German TFP depends positively on the innate
talent of entrepreneurs setting up a business in West Germany (Q¯t)
gt+1 = h(Q¯t/Pt+1).
Government After reunification, the government collects income taxes in both, East
and West Germany. The government also fixes the discount on East German wages (λt)
as well as the discount on the rental rate of capital in East Germany (χt). Tax revenues
are used to finance the difference in the rental rate to lenders but the government cannot
run a deficit.38 Each period contributions to the unemployment insurance from both
38In none of the calibrated versions of the model economy is the restriction on zero debt binding; i.e.
investment aids never exceed tax revenues.
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workers and entrepreneurs in East and West Germany have to be such as to fully finance
all unemployment benefits. Let Kd,∗t be aggregate capital demand in East Germany,
Wt denotes aggregate net wages of the economy, Πt are aggregate after-tax profits, and
UBt are aggregate unemployment benefits. Each period the government has to fulfill the
following two constraints
Gt + χtRtK
d,∗
t = τ(Πt +Wt)− ττut Wt (3.19)
with Gt ≥ 0 ∨t, and
UBt = 2τ
u
t Wt. (3.20)
Equilibrium Given that East German wages are fixed above labor productivity, equilib-
ria after reunification are characterized by involuntary unemployment in East Germany.39
I require that for an equilibrium there be market clearing in the common markets for goods
and capital, and in at least the labor market in West Germany. I allow for the possibility
of closure of the East German labor market. Denote aggregate labor demand in East and
West Germany by Nd,∗t and N
d
t respectively. N
s,∗
t and N
s
t are aggregate labor supply in
East and West Germany. Aggregate capital demand in West Germany is denoted by Kdt .
Let Y s,∗t and Y
s
t be aggregate supply of goods in East and West Germany respectively.
Aggregate capital supply after reunification, Xt is given by the sum of the initial capital
stocks of West and East Germany. For the capital market to clear we require
Xt = Kt = K
d,∗
t +K
d
t . (3.21)
For the goods market to clear the following has to hold
Y s,∗t + Y
s
t = ω{Πt +Wt + UBt + (1 +Rt − δ)Xt}+ (1− ω){Πt +Wt +
+ UBt + (1 +Rt − δ)Xt}+Gt + χtRtKd,∗t + Ξt − (1− δ)Xt. (3.22)
Aggregate consumption, aggregate bequests, government consumption, and aggregate
moving costs (Ξt) have to equal the sum of production and the depreciated aggregate
capital stock. The labor market in West Germany has to clear, i.e. aggregate labor
supply has to equal aggregate labor demand
N st = N
d
t . (3.23)
We require the labor market in East Germany to be in positive net supply
N s,∗t ≥ Nd,∗t . (3.24)
39Involuntary unemployment is assigned randomly. As entrepreneurs hire ’efficiency units’ they are
indifferent between hiring few very capable or many less capable workers.
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Aggregate labor supply has to be bigger or equal aggregate labor demand. In case the
difference between supply and demand in the East German labor market is positive,
there is involuntary unemployment.40 In equilibrium the probability of involuntary un-
employment expected by East Germans, ψt has to equal the realized rate of involuntary
unemployment, i.e.
ψt =
N s,∗t −Nd,∗t
P ∗t+1
. (3.25)
We can now define an equilibrium for the model economy after reunification.41 Given an
initial aggregate capital stock Xt, an initial fraction of entrepreneurs L
1
t for West Ger-
many, and their talent Qt−1, a government policy, {τ, ς, λt, χt}, moving costs {ηjt , η∗,jt } for
j ∈ {h, l} and prices for labor and capital as well as a probability of involuntary unem-
ployment in East Germany {wt, Rt, ψt}, an equilibrium is a collection of
{ct(zpt , ηjt ; .), ct(zpt , η∗,jt ; .), bt(zpt , ηjt ; .), bt(zpt , η∗,jt ; .), zˆp,jt , zˆ∗,p,jt , qˆt, qˆ∗t , z˜tj, z˜∗,jt , q˜jt , τut , Gt} for p ∈
{0, 1} and j ∈ {h, l} such that:
1. {ct(zpt , ηjt ; .), bt(zpt , ηjt ; .), zˆp,jt , qˆt, z˜tj} solves the individual’s problem for West Ger-
mans of types p ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {h, l};
2. {ct(zpt , η∗,jt ; .), bt(zpt , η∗,jt ; .), zˆ∗,p,jt , qˆ∗t , z˜∗,jt , q˜jt} solves the individual’s problem for East
Germans of types p ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {h, l} who are not involuntarily unemployed;
3. for those individuals in East Germany who are involuntarily unemployed optimal de-
cisions about personal consumption and bequests coincide with those of voluntarily
unemployed individuals;
4. the rate of involuntary unemployment coincides with East Germans’s expectations,
equation 3.25 holds;
5. markets for goods and capital and the West German labor market clear;
6. the East German labor market is in positive net supply or inactive;
7. (τut ) is such that the unemployment insurance is self-financing, equation 3.20 holds;
8. the government’s budget is balanced, equation 3.19 holds with Gt ≥ 0.
40 Migration and occupational choices are only altered until expected involuntary unemployment is
equal to the realized rate. An individual who finds himself involuntarily unemployed cannot reconsider
his choice.
41Contrariwise to the equilibrium for West Germany before reunification, the equilibrium after reuni-
fication is not competitive, given the imposed wage in the East German labor market.
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3.2 Calibration
For the extended model economy, I maintain parameters values as fixed and calibrated for
the basic model (see Table 2.2).42 However, some additional parameters need to be spec-
ified. I fix values for the discount on wages as well as initial values for relative population
size, and capital stock, and calibrate values for relative TFP, the discount on the rental
rate, the fraction of mobile Germans, and their moving costs in order to match certain
reunification statistics. In 1991, wages in East Germany were set to 50% of West German
wages, by 1995, they were fixed at 70% and by 2007 they had reached about 80% of West
German wages. I use the intermediate value and set λt to 0.3.
43 The original population
of the GDR was equal to one fourth the size of the West German population.44 In order to
estimate the initial capital stock of the East German economy, I use data on the German
gross capital stock measured in prices of 2000, from the Statistische Bundesamt [2006]
and [2011]. In 1991, the per capita capital stock of East Germany was less than half the
per capita capital stock of West Germany, i.e. X∗t = 0.43Xt.
Table 3.5: Calibration Targets for the Extended Model Economy
Data Model
East to West German Labor Productivity 68% 67%
East-West Net Migration as % of Eastern Population 7.5% 7.5%
Investment Aid to West German GDP 1% 1%
East German Unemployment 27% 27%
The remaining parameters, relative TFP, the discount on the rental rate of capital in East
Germany χt, the fraction of mobile individuals θ, and their moving costs η
l
t are calibrated
to match the targets displayed in Table 3.5. The ratio of East to West German labor
productivity measured as GDP per employed person rose from 35% in 1991 to 78% in
2007 (Statistisches Bundesamt [2006]). I take the average value over the years 1991 to
2007 and set the calibration target for the ratio of labor productivities to 68%. I set the
initial ratio of East to West German TFP,
A∗t
At
to 0.7451 to match this target to the model’s
42Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln [2007] find that it takes two generations for East German preferences
to convert to those of West Germans. Assuming a different value for the preference parameter ω, for East
Germans does not have a direct effect on their occupational choices.
43 Even though by 2007 around 30% of firms in East Germany had opted out of collective agreements
(IAB Betriebspanel [2008]), on average East German labor costs per hour in 2008 were only 27.9% lower
compared to West German labor costs (Statistisches Bundesamt [2011]).
44The mass of the entire German population is normalized to one; Pt individuals live in West Germany
and P ∗t = 1−Pt individuals live in East Germany. After reunification, migration may alter the population
size of East and West Germany.
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ratio of output over workers and managers in East and West Germany. The discount on
the rental rate of capital in East Germany χt, is calibrated to a value of 0.201 to match
a ratio of investment-aid to West German GDP of 1%.45 According to Wurzel [2001]
between 1991 and 1995 annual public transfers for support to enterprises and business-
near infrastructure were in the range of 0.63% and 0.99% of West German GDP.46 The
fraction of mobile individuals θ, is assigned a value of 0.5 to match that net migration from
East Germany between 1989 and 2002 amounted to 7.5% of the original population of East
Germany. I set moving costs for mobile Germans ηlt, to a value of 42.34% of per capita
GDP of a pre-reunification generation in the model in order to match an unemployment
rate of 27%.47 Table 3.6 contains all additional parameter values for the extended model
economy.
Table 3.6: Additional Parameters for the Extended Model Economy
Discount on East German Wages (λt) 0.3
Initial Ratio of East to West German Population 0.25
Initial Ratio of East to West German Capital Stock 0.43
Initial Ratio of East to West German TFP 0.7451
Discount on East German Rental Rate (χt) 0.201
Fraction of Mobile Germans (θ) 0.5
Moving Costs for Mobile Germans (ηlt) 0.42
Yt−1
Pt−1
4 Results
I simulate the extended model economy for one period (one generation). The extended
model economy hits the calibration targets of Table 3.5 well. Table 4.7 displays additional
results for one generation after reunification. Results show a lack of entrepreneurship in
East Germany as pointed out by the OECD [2007a]. After reunification 6.4% of East
Germans set up their own business, but around 24% of them do so in West Germany. Of
45The estimated value of χt = 0.201 is somewhat in line with Ragnitz [2002] who finds that in 2000
most firms in East Germany still received investment aids of around one quarter of their investment costs.
46These do not include special depreciation allowances, debt servicing expenditure and credits.
47The Sachversta¨ndigenrat [2007] publishes numbers of registered and hidden unemployed. Between
1993 and 2003, the number of hidden unemployed in East Germany was on average equal to 55% of
registered unemployed. Hence while, the average official East German unemployment rate for 1991 to 2007
was 17.5% (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit [2008]), adding the “hidden” unemployed increases unemployment
to around 27%. Moving costs for East Germans η∗,jt are assumed to be equal to moving costs for West
Germans. Immobile Germans face infinitely high moving costs, ηht =∞.
26
those who stay in East Germany only 5.3% set up a business, compared to 6.9% of West
Germans before reunification. This difference in entrepreneurship rates is reflected in the
lower number of entreprises per 1000 inhabitants in East compared to West Germany (see
Table ).48 After reunification, no West German migrates to East Germany to set up a
business there. The fraction of West German entrepreneurs decreases slightly to 6.8%,
due to a higher rental rate of capital. A lower aggregate per capita capital stock and high
capital demand by East German firms that face lower capital costs lead to a rise in the
rental rate of capital. In addition, the lower per capita capital stock reduces the aggre-
gate capital-output ratio. An inflow of talented East German entrepreneurs increases the
fraction of entrepreneurs in the new West German population to 7.1%. Relative accumu-
lative talent of entrepreneurs in West Germany increases and causes West German TFP
to grow at an annual rate of 1.66%, compared to 1.57% before reunification. East German
entrepreneurs are immobile or less talented individuals and relative accumulative talent
of entrepreneurs in East Germany is 13.6% lower than in West Germany. Thus, TFP in
East Germany grows at a lower rate of 1.42%. On the aggregate, TFP grows at an annual
rate of 1.61%. Increased aggregate TFP growth leads to a slight decrease in the value
of parental background. Having had a parent who was an entrepreneur increases one’s
managerial knowhow by 69.5%, (φ = 0.695).
The fraction of individuals from an entrepreneurial parental background who become
entrepreneurs decreases slightly, from 60% to 59.5%, while the fraction of those from a
working family background increases from 3% to 3.6%. This is due to the fact that all East
German entrepreneurs have a working family background.49 In the first generation after
reunification, GDP per capita in West Germany increases by 2.25% annually, only slightly
lower than the annual GDP growth rate of 2.26% for West Germany before reunification.
The model’s estimates of the per capita GDP ratio for East to West Germany of 52% is
eight percentage points lower than the average ratio of 60% for 1991 to 2008 in the data
(Statistische A¨mter der La¨nder [2011]). About one third of the East German unemployed,
around 10% of the East German population, are involuntarily unemployed. The remaining
two-thirds, 17% of East Germans, decide not to work.
48Self-employment rates in East and West Germany of around 8% on the other hand have become very
similar as of 2009. However, these rates also include professionals without employees and between 2003
and 2006 unemployed who were paid additional benefits conditional on setting up their own business
(’Ich-AG’). Hence, a better statistic for entrepreneurship is the ’possible outcome’ of self-employment,
the number of enterprises (see Table 1.1).
49According to Solga [2006], elite reproduction (i.e. outflow from nomenklatura to upper service class
positions) in East Germany was limited and education and acquired skills rather than party membership
were the dominant criteria for elite recruitment after 1989.
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Table 4.7: Reunification: Results After One Generation
Entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurs 6.7%
Entrepreneurs in East Germany 5.3%
East German Entrepreneurs 6.4%
... of those going West 23.8%
Entrepreneurs in West Germany 7.1%
West Germans Entrepreneurs 6.8%
... of those going East 0
Entrepreneurial background individuals becoming entrepreneurs 59.5%
Working background individuals becoming entrepreneurs 3.6%
Value of Entrepreneurial Parental Background 0.695
Entrepreneurs ’s relative accumulative talent 1.43
... in East (Q¯∗t /P ∗t+1) 1.27
... in West (Q¯t/Pt+1) 1.47
Germany
Annual Capital-Output Ratio 2.26
Annual Rental Rate of Capital 6.8%
Unemployment Rate 9.4%
Annual Growth Rate of TFP 1.61%
Investment Aid to Government Revenue 6.6%
Fraction of Taxes Paid in West Germany 89.5%
Contribution to Unemployment Insurance 1.65%
Fraction of Contributions paid in East Germany 10.5%
Fraction of Unemployment Benefits Paid in East Germany 52.6%
West Germany
Annual Growth Rate of TFP 1.66%
Annual Growth Rate of GDP per capita 2.25%
Unemployment Rate 5.5%
Average Firm Size 12.4
East Germany
Annual Output per Capita East to West 51.7%
Annual Growth Rate of TFP 1.41%
Unemployment Rate 27%
of those involuntarily unemployed 33.4%
Fraction of Workers going West 8.7%
Average Firm Size 13.0
Moving Costs to annual GDP per capita East 12.5%
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As benefits are indexed by West German wages the fraction of voluntarily unemployed
in East Germany clearly exceeds the one in West Germany.50 The West German unem-
ployment rate remains almost unchanged and aggregate unemployment increases to 9.4%.
This result of the model is very much in line with data. Average aggregate unemployment
between 1992 and 2007 was 9.8% (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit [2007]).
More unemployed individuals and unchanged unemployment benefits require an increase
in the contribution to unemployment insurance to 1.65%. More than half of all unem-
ployment benefits are paid out in East Germany, while East German workers and en-
trepreneurs contribute only 10.5% to the insurance scheme. Data by the Bundesagentur
fu¨r Arbeit [2006] indicate a cross subsidizing of unemployment benefits between East and
West Germany but to a lesser extent. Between 1996 and 2006, on average 35.4% of un-
employment benefits were paid out in East Germany. Income of the unemployed in East
Germany is thus subsidized by West German contributions and workers and entrepreneurs
in West Germany contribute 89.5% to government revenues of which 6.6% are used for
investment aids for entrepreneurs in East Germany. Entrepreneurs in East Germany hire
on average 0.6 workers more than entrepreneurs in West Germany. This results of the
model is consistent with data showing that the small and medium sized sector is relatively
more important in West than in East Germany.51 Around 9% of East German workers
migrate to West Germany. Their moving costs and those of East Germans entrepreneurs
are equal to around 12.5% of annual East German GDP per capita.52
Micro-Data Ideally one would like to consider micro-data for evidence on the possible
interaction of occupational choice and migration. Table 4.8 displays statistics on East-
West migration and self-employment taken from the unbalanced German Socioeconomic
Panel (GSOEP) for 1992 to 2006. However, given the very small sample size – for instance
there are only 32 observations over 14 years on East German self-employed who migrate
permanently to West Germany – these statistics can only be viewed as suggestive. Data in
Table 4.8 indicates a difference of 20% in the fractions of entrepreneurs in East and West
50This result is in line with findings by Snower and Merkl [2006] and Canova and Ravn [2000] who
assign an important role to generous welfare provisions in explaining low output and employment in East
Germany.
51 Data from the Statistische Bundesamt [2008] shows that in 2004 there were 39 and 33.8 firms with
0-9 employees, 2.9 and 2.7 firms with 10-49 and 0.7 and 0.7 firms with 50 and more employees in West
and East Germany respectively (per 1000 inhabitants).
52Simulating the model for up to five additional generations with decreasing moving costs and con-
vergence of TFP levels in East and West Germany results in a similar scenario for West Germany in
terms of rates of unemployment, fraction of entrepreneurs, and GDP growth, while the situation in East
Germany will be characterized by empty regions with very few active individuals who are immobile and
of low talent.
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Germany, of a similar magnitude as the difference estimated by the model.53 Migration
from East to West Germany is slightly higher in this data set than in the data used for
calibration, while migration from West to East Germany is very limited (it is zero in the
model). Despite a larger West German population for every four self-employed migrating
from East to West, there is only one West German self-employed setting up a business
in East Germany. Hence fewer East Germans become entrepreneurs compared to West
Germans while migrating to the other part of Germany and setting up a business there
seems to be an option East German consider more often.
Table 4.8: GSOEP Unbalanced Panel Data on Occupation and Migration 1992-2006
West (Sample A) East (Sample C)
Ratios for 18-65 year olds in labor force
(number of observations)
Self-employed 8.8% (765) 7.0% (395)
Permanent migrants to East and West respectively 1.1% (92) 10.5% (597)
Permanent migrants among Self employed 1.0% (8) 8.1% (32)
5 Counterfactual Experiments
Given prospects of a deserted East Germany, the question arises: How could East Ger-
many’s growth experience have been different? Especially the wage-setting policy seemed
to have oppressed incentives to become an entrepreneur. In addition the importance of
parental background for becoming an entrepreneur in West Germany makes it difficult for
East German individuals to compete in terms of managerial knowhow. Furthermore, free
migration to West Germany implies an attractive outside option for East Germans. I per-
form three counterfactual experiments that assume for the first period after reunification,
1)East Germany has flexible wages, 2)Parental background has no value for managerial
knowhow, and 3)migration between East and West Germany is inhibited. Results of all
counterfactual experiments are presented together with Benchmark results (one period
after reunification).For results to be comparable to the Benchmark case I adjust the dis-
count on the rental rate of capital (χt) such as to keep the absolute amount of investment
aid paid at the Benchmark level.
53Difference in levels between model and data are most likely due to the fact that the fraction of
entrepreneurs in the model refers to self-employed with employees while the data set includes also own-
account workers.
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Flexible Wages In this counterfactual experiment I allow for wages to freely adjust in
each of the locally separated labor markets.I assume that moving costs, and unemploy-
ment benefits paid are maintained as specified in Tables 2.2 and 3.6.54 In order to avoid
introducing a motive for unemployed to migrate as well, unemployment benefits in both
parts of Germany are specified as fractions of West German wages. Table 5.9 displays
results of this counterfactual experiment. If wages in East Germany are to adjust freely,
Table 5.9: Flexible Wages
Benchmark Flexible Wages
Wage per efficiency unit East 100 98.0
Entrepreneurs in East Germany 5.3% 5.6%
East German Entrepreneurs 6.4% 6.4%
... of those going West 23.8% 17.1%
Unemployed East 27% 18.1%
of those involuntarily unemployed 33.4% 0
Net Wage per efficiency unit West 100 100.4
Annual Output per Capita East to West 51.7% 58.5%
Annual Output per capita East 100 112.4
Annual Output per capita West 100 99.2
Total Annual Output per capita 100 100.4
Annual Growth Rate of TFP East 1.41% 1.55%
Annual Growth Rate of TFP West 1.66% 1.63%
Annual Growth Rate of TFP Total 1.61% 1.61%
Average profits Entrepreneur in East 100 105.0
Average profits Entrepreneur in West 100 100.8
Average profits Entrepreneur West German 100 100.4
Average profits Entrepreneur East German in West 100 113.5
Net migration to Population East 7.5% 5.1%
Fraction of Workers going West 8.7% 5.2%
they fall. Gross wages per efficiency unit are 2% lower than in the Benchmark scenario.
This fall is large enough to reduce unemployment by nine percentage points to 18%. All
unemployment is voluntary. The fact that the rate of voluntarily unemployment in East
Germany is more than three times the one in West Germany is due to unemployment
benefits being linked to West German wages. Lower East German wages translate into
higher profits for entrepreneurs, and a larger fraction of East Germans set up a business
54 Note that the guess on involuntary unemployment in East Germany in this case is zero and Equa-
tion 3.14 reduces to (1− τut − τ)w∗t q.
31
in East Germany, 5.6% compared to 5.3%. Less unemployment and more entrepreneurs
imply higher output. Per capita output in East Germany is 12% higher while per capita
output in West Germany drops slightly. Thus, the ratio of GDP per capita East-to-West
increases to 58.5%. Lower labor costs in East Germany make it relatively less profitable
to set up a business in West Germany and fewer entrepreneurs migrate, 17% compared
to 23% in the benchmark scenario. More and more talented entrepreneurs in East Ger-
many cause East German TFP to grow at an annual rate of 1.55%. In West Germany on
the other hand, there are fewer talented entrepreneurs from East Germany which leads
to a reduction in output per capita and TFP growth. West German workers are better
off because due to the reduced contribution to unemployment insurance their net wages
increase slightly. Increased migration of workers that was supposedly feared by labor
unions that pressed for equal wages in East and West Germany does not happen. While
workers’ wages are lower, their expected wages increase as the threat of involuntary un-
employment is eliminated. Hence, less workers migrate to West Germany, 5.2% compared
to 8.7% under the Benchmark scenario. Overall migration is reduced by almost one third
and of all East Germans, 5.1% leave. In terms of welfare, East German workers are worse
off while all entrepreneurs and West German workers gain. On average the East German
individual is better off. This positive effect for East Germany dominates and while overall
TFP growth remains unchanged, output per capita is slightly higher under the flexible
wage scenario. Given that consumption is a fixed fraction of output in this model, flexible
wages are welfare improving for all of Germany.
Integration into Socially Mobile West Germany Had East Germany been inte-
grated into an economy where an individual’s managerial knowhow was solely defined
by his innate talent, the initial disadvantage of missing generations of entrepreneurs in
East Germany would have become obsolete. For this counterfactual experiment I main-
tain the wage discounts for East Germany but set the value of parental background in
entrepreneurship to zero. Average managerial knowhow is thus the same for East and
West Germans and in order for the average German managerial knowhow in this scenario
to be equal to the one in the Benchmark scenario the parameter for the mean log talent
µ is raised to 2.148. Table 5.10 displays the model’s results for the integration of East
Germany into a socially mobile economy.
If parental background has no role for managerial knowhow, the fraction of East Germans
who become entrepreneurs is 31% higher than under the Benchmark scenario, 8.4% in-
stead of 6.4% of East Germans set up their own business. However 37.3% of them do so
in West Germany. Unemployment is reduced by eight percentage points from 27% to 19%
but 3.4% of the East German population is still involuntary unemployed. Migration is
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slightly lower due to the reduction in involuntary unemployment, 6.4% of East Germans
migrate to West Germany compared to 7.5% in the Benchmark case.
Table 5.10: Integration into Socially Mobile Economy
Benchmark Integration into
Socially Mobile
Economy
Wage per efficiency unit West 100 97.9
Entrepreneurs in East Germany 5.3% 5.6%
East German Entrepreneurs 6.4% 8.4%
... of those going West 23.8% 37.3%
Average profits Entrepreneur in East 100 103.3
Average profits Entrepreneur in West 100 118.1
Average profits Entrepreneur West German 100 122.0
Average profits Entrepreneur East German in West 100 86.41
Unemployed East 27% 19.2%
of those involuntarily unemployed 33.4% 17.9%
Annual Growth Rate of TFP East 1.41% 1.53%
Annual Growth Rate of TFP West 1.66% 1.92%
Annual Growth Rate of TFP Total 1.61% 1.85%
Annual Output per Capita East to West 51.7% 57.1%
Annual Output per capita East 100 110.8
Annual Output per capita West 100 100.3
Total Annual Output per capita 100 101.3
Net migration to Population East 7.5% 6.7%
Workers going West 8.7% 4.9%
Entrepreneurial Backgr.
Indvs. Becoming Entrepreneurs 59.5% 5.26%
Working Backgr.
Indvs. Becoming Entrepreneurs 3.6% 5.92%
However, the composition of migrants changes. More East Germans migrate to West
Germany to set up their business and fewer East Germans migrate to work in West Ger-
many, 4.9% compared to 8.7%. Higher employment leads to more output. East Germany
produces 10% more output per capita and its TFP grows at a higher rate. Given, no
value of parental background for managerial knowhow, talent is optimally allocated and
aggregate TFP growth is higher, overall output per capita is higher and welfare improves
with respect to the Benchmark scenario. The fraction of entrepreneurs coming from an
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entrepreneurial family background is reduced to values for individuals coming from a
working family background.55
Migration Restriction If migration between East and West Germany is inhibited,
occupational choices of East Germans are equal to those of West Germans before reuni-
fication. For this counterfactual experiment I assume that all East and West Germans
are immobile, i.e. have infinitely large moving costs. I set the fraction of mobile Ger-
mans θ, to zero and maintain all parameter values as well as the wage discount. Table 5.11
displays the model’s results for the case of no migration between East and West Germany.
Table 5.11: Migration Restrictions
Benchmark No Migration
Entrepreneurs in East Germany 5.3% 5.4%
Average profits Entrepreneur in East 100 113.5
Average profits Entrepreneur in West 100 99.4
Average profits Entrepreneur West German 100 100.2
Gross Wage per efficiency unit West 100 100
Contribution to Unemployment Insurance 1.65% 1.5%
Net Wage per efficiency unit West 100 100.2
Unemployed East 27% 21.3%
of those involuntarily unemployed 33.4% 23.2 %
Annual Growth Rate of TFP East 1.41% 1.66%
Annual Growth Rate of TFP West 1.66% 1.60 %
Annual Growth Rate of TFP Total 1.61% 1.61%
Annual Output per Capita East to West 51.7% 61.4%
Annual Output per capita East 100 116.7
Annual Output per capita West 100 98.3
Total Annual Output per capita 100 99.7
Average Firm Size 13.0 13.6
Without the option to migrate 5.4% of East Germans decide to set up their own busi-
ness. Those talented entrepreneurs who opt for migration under the benchmark scenario,
now set up their businesses in East Germany. Thus, average profits in East Germany
55The fact that the latter fraction is slightly larger than the former, 5.9% versus 5.2% is entirely due to
the fact that all East German entrepreneurs are children of workers. For West German individuals these
fractions are identical.
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increase by 13% despite the lower discount on the rental rate of capital. More talented
entrepreneurs hire more workers and the average firm size increases by 0.6 workers. More
employment is created and unemployment is reduced by about six percentage points. Still
23.2% of the unemployed, i.e. about 5% of the East German population is involuntary
unemployed. More and more talented entrepreneurs also contribute to TFP growth which
is high at 1.66% annually, an increase of 18% over TFP growth in the Benchmark case.
More and better entrepreneurs and higher employment lead to more output. Without
the option to migrate East German per capita output is 17% larger compared to the
Benchmark scenario. West Germany on the other hand, deprived of the inflow of talented
entrepreneurs from East Germany sees its output per capita reduced by around 2% and
faces lower TFP growth. In the case of complete restrictions on migrations the nega-
tive effects for West Germany dominate and while overall TFP growth remains constant,
output per capita is 0.3% lower compared to the Benchmark scenario and thus welfare
slightly decreases.
6 Conclusion
East Germany’s post-1989 experience is and has been remarkably different from that of
other transition countries. While East Germany is suffering from high rates of unemploy-
ment and low economic growth, other transition countries are flourishing. This paper
argues that East Germany’s integration into an established and highly regulated economy
hindered a fruitful development of entrepreneurial activity. Especially the West German
policy of fixing wages in East Germany at a fraction of West German wages oppressed
incentives to set up businesses.56 In addition the option to migrate to West Germany drew
in the most talented and mobile East Germans, while the importance of entrepreneurial
parental background in West Germany, implied an initial disadvantage for East Germans
who lacked any entrepreneurial tradition.
Counterfactual experiments show that East Germany’s experience could have been bet-
ter had wages been flexible in East and West Germany, had parental background in
entrepreneurship played no role for managerial knowhow, or had migration to West Ger-
many been very costly. However, while flexible wages and managerial knowhow defined
by innate talent only would have also led to more output and higher economic growth
for all of Germany, migration restrictions would have been exclusively beneficial to East
German output and economic growth. The lack of entrepreneurship, employment, and
56For Southern Italy, Alesina et al [2001] find a similar negative effect of a government wage setting
policy - high public sector wages - on entrepreneurship.
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economic growth in East Germany would have been less severe had West German policy
makers opted for flexible wages in both parts of Germany. Results of counterfactual exper-
iments show that contrary to conventional wisdom, flexible wages would have decreased
migration from East to West Germany as the threat of involuntary unemployment had
disappeared and expected wages for those staying in East Germany would have increased.
Based on the calibration of the model, in a world of flexible wages around 416,000 fewer
East Germans would have migrated to work or set up a business in West Germany. In
essence, East Germany’s economic take-off seems to have been hindered by West German
policies and institutions.57 The model’s result for the counterfactual experiments even
suggest that under the current reunification scenario, West Germany benefited from a se-
lective inflow of migration. One is thus left with the question to what extent the current
reunification scenario has been self-serving for West Germans.
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A Appendix
A.1 Growth Rates
Figure A-1: Growth Rates of Real GDP per Capita (chained)
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A.2 Migration Rates
Figure A-2: Migration within Germany of 25-50 year-olds
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A.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Figure A-3: Sensitivity Analysis for α and φ¯−Growth Rate (g)
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Figure A-4: Sensitivity Analysis for α and φ¯ - Ratio of Likelihoods
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A.4 Occupational Choices after Reunification
East Germans East German individuals compare their potential wage in West Ger-
many to the wage they can earn in East Germany. The cut-off value, q˜t
j, describes the
East German individual who is indifferent between working in East or West Germany
q˜t
j =
ψtςwt+η
∗,j
t
(1−τut −τ)(ψt+λt−ψtλt)wt . Higher moving cost (η
∗,j
t ) reduce labor income in West Ger-
many and thus the benefits from migration and raise the threshold as well as do higher
wages in East Germany, a lower λt. A positive possibility of involuntary unemployment
ψt, reduces the potential income of working in East Germany and thus lowers the thresh-
old. Comparing their potential wage in West Germany to the profits they can make
as entrepreneurs, East Germans set up their own business in East Germany whenever,
pit(z
p
t , A
∗
t ; .) ≥ (1− τut − τ)wtq− η∗,jt . The cut-off value, zˆ∗,p,jt , describes the East German
individual who is indifferent between working in West Germany or setting up a business
in East Germany.58 Furthermore, East Germans measure profits they can make as en-
trepreneurs in East Germany, against profits they can make setting up their business in
West Germany. The cut-off value, z˜t
∗,p,j describes the East German individual who is
indifferent between setting up his business in East or West Germany
z˜t
∗,p,j =
η∗jt (wt(1 + τut )) (1−ν)γ1−γ R νγ1−γt Ψ−1t
(
1− A
∗
t
At(1− λt)
(1−ν)γ
1−γ (1− χt)
νγ
1−γ
)−1
1−γ
1−γ+κ
.
This threshold of occupational choice is independent of the individual’s parental back-
ground, z˜t
∗,p,j = z˜t∗,j. Higher moving cost (η
∗,j
t ) reduce entrepreneurial income in West
Germany and increase the threshold. Higher wages in East Germany on the other hand,
a lower λt, reduce entrepreneurial income in East Germany and thus lower the threshold
as does a higher rental rate for capital, a lower χt. This last threshold is positive only if
(1 − λt)(1−ν)γ(1 − χt)νγ > A
∗
t
At
1−γ
. Only if the discount on wages and the discount on the
rental rate of capital are small enough to not offset the higher TFP in West Germany do
East German individuals decide to set up a business in West Germany. Finally, individuals
also compare the unemployment benefit vt to their potential wage in East Germany. The
cut-off value qˆ∗t , describing the East German individual who is indifferent between working
in East Germany or being unemployed is given by qˆ∗t =
ς
(1−τut −τ)(1−λt) . Some of the compar-
isons individuals make in order to make their optimal occupational choice were omitted in
58 Note that the profit function for entrepreneurs in East Germany and the function for wage income
in West Germany might cross twice. Initially being an entrepreneur in East Germany is always better
than working in West Germany, due to fixed moving costs. However, with increasing talent wage income
increases and individuals are able to pay the fixed costs and thus might prefer to work in West Germany
instead of setting up a business in East Germany. Given increasing returns to knowhow for entrepreneurs,
there might exist a second threshold where setting up a business in East Germany becomes again more
attractive as opposed to working in West Germany, (zˆ∗,0,lt (q) in Figure 3.2) .
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Figure 3.2 in the main body of the paper in order to keep visualization clean and because
they are not relevant for results discussed later. However, in the model individuals have to
compare among each occupation and rank them in order to make the right choice. Here
I present additional comparisons as well as the resulting consequences for equilibrium
equation. East German individuals also compare working in East Germany to setting up
a business in East Germany. Whenever pit(z
p
t , A
∗
t ; .) ≥ (1−ψt)(1−τut −τ)(1−λt)wtq+ψtvt
they set up their own business in East Germany. However, this choice is only relevant
whenever the resulting threshold is smaller than the one resulting from the choice between
working in East or West Germany (q˜jt ). In this case the marginal worker who goes to West
Germany is more talented than the marginal entrepreneur in East Germany. Then only if
the profit function for entrepreneurs in East Germany and the function for wage income
in West Germany cross twice will there be any East German working in West Germany.
In all equilibrium equations one would have to substitute the new threshold for zˆ∗,p,jt and
possibly q˜ for the second crossing of the profit function for entrepreneurs in East Germany
and the function for wage income in West Germany.
East Germans compare incomes from working in West Germany to profits from setting
up a business in West Germany. Whenever pit(z
p
t , At, η
∗,j
t ; .) ≥ (1 − τut − τ)wtq − η∗,jt ,
they decide to set up a business in West Germany instead of working there. This oc-
cupational choice is only relevant whenever the marginal entrepreneur who sets up his
business in West Germany exists and has less knowhow than the marginal entrepreneur
in East Germany. Then, depending on the curvature of the profit function there might
be no East German who wants to set up his business in East Germany. It could also
be the case that those with less talent than the marginal worker who migrates to West
Germany set up their businesses in East Germany. If East Germans find it profitable
to go to West Germany to set up a business there, discounts on wages and rental rate
are not large enough to offset the lower TFP in East Germany. Hence, neither will West
Germans set up a business in East Germany. Individuals in East Germany also com-
pare working in East Germany to setting up a business in West Germany. Whenever
pit(z
p
t , At, η
∗,j
t ; .) ≥ (1−ψt)(1− τut − τ)(1− λt)wtq+ψtvt, they decide to set up a business
in West Germany instead of working in East Germany. Again this choice is only relevant
if the marginal entrepreneur who sets up his business in West Germany exists and has less
knowhow and talent than the marginal entrepreneur in East Germany and the marginal
worker who migrates to West Germany. Thresholds resulting from comparing unemploy-
ment benefits to wages paid in West Germany, or possible profits earned in East or West
Germany, are never relevant. Situations in which they could matter are ruled out, given
that West Germans only migrate to East Germany to set up their businesses there.
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West Germans The cut-off value of managerial knowhow z˜t
p,j, describes the individual
who is indifferent between setting up his business in West or East Germany
z˜t
p,j =
ηjt (wt(1 + τut ) (1−ν)γ1−γ R νγ1−γt Ψ−1t
(
A∗t
At(1− λt)
(1−ν)γ
1−γ (1− χt)
νγ
1−γ
− 1
)−1
1−γ
1−γ+κ
.
This threshold of occupational choice is independent of an individual’s parental back-
ground, z˜t
p,j = z˜t
j. Higher moving cost (ηjt ), a lower discount on wages (λt), and a lower
discount on the rental rate of capital (χt), all reduce entrepreneurial income in East Ger-
many and thus raise the threshold. As managerial knowhow is defined in the interval zpt ∈
(0, z¯pt ] this last threshold needs to be strictly positive, i.e:
A∗t
At(1−λt)
(1−ν)γ
1−γ (1−χt)
νγ
1−γ
− 1 > 0.
This is the case only if (1 − λt)(1−ν)γ(1 − χt)νγ < A
∗
t
At
1−γ
. West Germans also compare
their wage income to profits from setting up a business in East Germany. Whenever
pit(z
p
t , A
∗
t , η
j
t ; .) ≥ (1 − τut − τ)wtq, they decide to set up a business in East Germany
instead of working in West Germany. However, the threshold resulting from this choice
is only relevant whenever z˜jt ≥ 0, and z˜jt ≤ zˆpt , i.e. whenever the marginal entrepreneur
who sets up his business in East Germany exists and has less knowhow than the marginal
entrepreneur in West Germany. In this case in all equilibrium equations one would have
to substitute the new threshold for zˆpt and z¯
p
t for z˜
j
t . Individuals in West Germany also
compare unemployment benefits to profits from setting up a business in East Germany.
Whenever pit(z
p
t , A
∗
t , η
j
t ; .) ≥ vt, they decide to set up a business in East Germany instead
of being unemployed. Only if z˜jt ≥ 0 and z˜jt ≤ zˆpt and z˜jt < q?t does this choice become
relevant, i.e. whenever the marginal entrepreneur who sets up his business in East Ger-
many exists and has less knowhow than the marginal entrepreneur in West Germany and
also less knowhow than the marginal worker.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3.1
The threshold of managerial knowhow that determines who is indifferent between setting
up a business in East or West Germany only exists for West German individuals if (1 −
λt)
(1−ν)γ(1 − χt)νγ < A
∗
t
At
1−γ
and for East Germans this threshold only exists if (1 −
λt)
(1−ν)γ(1− χt)νγ > A
∗
t
At
1−γ
. These conditions are mutually exclusive.
A.6 Discussion- Intergenerational Persistence of Occupations
How many entrepreneurs come from an entrepreneurial family background? Looking at
West German data for 1970 and 1980, Arum and Mu¨ller [2004] find that 14.7% of all self-
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employed had a self-employed father. Lohmann and Luber [2004] report that between
1984 and 1988, 36% of West German males with a self-employment family background
became self-employed. On the other end of the scale, Klein [2000] finds that only 39% of
all German family firms are in their founder generations, rising the likelihood of being an
entrepreneur if one’s parents were so to 61%. Similarly, Pistrui et al [2000] find that 60%
of West German entrepreneurs have a parent who had been an entrepreneur. According
to Mueller [2006] German employees whose parents have been self-employed are about 1.5
times as likely to start a business as others.59 Geißler [2006] differentiates between social
mobility of entrepreneurs with more than 10 employees and those operating on a smaller
scale. He estimates that 50% of the former and 19% of the latter had parents who were
also entrepreneurs. Given the broad span of estimates for the persistence of entrepreneur-
ship across generations, I consider alternative interpretations of occupational inheritance.
Within the framework of the model the most wealthy individuals, who consume more and
leave more bequests to their children, will always be entrepreneurs. Hence, one can clearly
distinguish between three different economic ’classes’ in the model: the unemployed, the
working class, and the entrepreneurial class. The question of ’how many entrepreneurs
come from an entrepreneurial family background?’ can thus be turned into a question of
1)class mobility and/or 2)wealth persistence and/or 3)earnings mobility.
West Germany is generally found to be a society of relatively little class mobility. Erik-
son and Goldthorpe [1993] conclude that in West Germany “quite contrary to a [...]
’semi-classless’ form of society and a ’land of fluidity’ [...] historically formed influences
on class-mobility chances have largely retained their power” (p.151) Mu¨ller and Pol-
lak [2004] consider class mobility in West Germany and find that for the periods 1976-80,
1982-90, and 1991-99, 64%, 63%, and 63% of large employers, and higher and lower grade
professionals with higher technical, administrative and managerial occupations remained
within their class. Furthermore, the authors conclude that “we cannot find any major
changes in (absolute) mobility experiences in the last quarter of the twentieth century.”
(pg.91) “Germany continues to have strong inheritance effects [...] as well as particularly
marked distinctions between a manual and non-manual space of social mobility.”(pg.110)
“In sum [...] in Germany a large part of the effects of origin class on class destination is
mediated through education. In particular the hierarchical component in class-mobility
results from class inequalities in educational participation and education-based class al-
location.”(pg.106) This observation combined with recent data by the OECD [2007b]
showing that “students from a blue-collar background are about one-half as likely to be
in higher education as compared with what their proportion in the population would sug-
gest.”(pg.116) indicate little class mobility in West Germany.60
59For the US Lentz and Laband [1990] find that 50% of all self-employed proprietors are 2nd generation
proprietors.
60Comparing social mobility among European countries, Breen and Luijkx [2004] conclude that “Ger-
many, France, Italy, and Ireland seem to be the least fluent countries [...] [in]-notably Germany- there
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Estimates of wealth persistence by Morck et al. [1998] also sketch a picture of rather
limited intergenerational mobility in West Germany, while Solon [2002] cites estimates
of intergenerational earnings elasticity that describe Germany as a country of relatively
high earnings mobility. However, as Goldberger [1989] points out: “Naturally enough the
sociologists’ models incorporate outcomes other than income or earnings. Now suppose
that intergenerational links are stronger for occupation or socioeconomic status than for
income or earnings. Then restricting attention to the monetary measures could lead an
economist to understate the influence of family background on inequality.”(pg.513). Esti-
mates on class mobility provide the most widely encompassing concept of the dependence
of one’s status on family background. In the model class mobility and occupational mo-
bility coincide and thus given that Pistrui et al [2000]’s and Mu¨ller and Pollak [2004]’s
estimates are very similar I am confident using the former as a target for calibration.
is no statistically significant change[...] towards a weaker association between origins and destinations.”
(pg 73).
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